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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
sible appeal.92 Failure to utilize the informal procedure is not a waiver
of the right to a formal ruling.
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
Collateral Estoppel: Court of Appeals affirms that prior judgment
establishing freedom from negligence does not establish freedom from
contributory negligence.
In Nesbitt v. Nimmich,93 the Court of Appeals recently affirmed
without opinion an Appellate Division, Second Department, decision
which held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not operate
to establish the plaintiffs freedom from contributory negligence where
his freedom from negligence as a defendant was determined in a
prior action. The case involved a personal injury action between
parties who were co-defendants in the prior suit. The Second Depart-
ment's refusal to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
was based on the difference in the burden of proof accompanying
the movant's change in status from defendant to plaintiff. The plain-
tiff's inability to establish the defendant's negligence in the prior
action should not permit the inference that the defendant can over-
come his burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence in
a subsequent action in which he is the plaintiff.
ARTicLE 71- REcoVERY OF CHAT L
CPLR 7102: Due process protects all types of property.
Since the 1969 Supreme Court decision in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.,94 there have been important developments in replevin
law. In Sniadach, the Court set the direction by declaring that a hear-
ing or an opportunity to defend a replevin action before the garnish-
ment of one's salary was necessary to satisfy the requirements of due
process. While Sniadach was concerned with wages, a "specialized type
of property"9 5 the deprivation of which may cause great personal
92 7B McKINNEYS CPLR 3124, commentary at 630 (1970), citing Tri-State Pipe Lines
Corp. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 26 App. Div. 2d 285, 273 N.Y.S.2d 976 (lst Dep't 1966), discussed
in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 128, 142 (1967).
93 80 N.Y.2d 622, 282 N.E.2d 328, 331 N.YS.2d 438 (1972), aff'g mem. 34 App. Div. "2d
958, 812 N.Y.S.2d 766 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST.
JoIN's L. REv. 500, 521 (1971).
94895 U.S. 387 (1969). For extended discussion of Sniadach, see Note, Provisional
Remedies in New York Reappraised Under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.: A Con-
stitutional Fly in the Creditor's Ointment, 34 ALBnAN~Y L. Rv. 426, 438 (1970); Note,
Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 CoLUas. L. Rxv. 942 (1970); The Quarterly Survey, 46
ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 355, 879 (1971).
95 895 U.S. at 340.
